Alabama Law Blog

Ms. Amber Ladner voted as a Rising Star in the Alabama Super Lawyers Section of Criminal Defense

Tue, 08 May 2012 15:08:00 GMT

Ms. Amber L. Ladner was voted today in the Alabama Super Lawyers for 2012 as a Rising Star in the area of Criminal Defense.

Ms. Amber Ladner voted as a Rising Star in the Alabama Super Lawyers Section of Criminal Defense

Tue, 08 May 2012 15:08:00 GMT

Ms. Amber L. Ladner was voted today in the Alabama Super Lawyers for 2012 as a Rising Star in the area of Criminal Defense.

Kidd v. State of Alabama

Thu, 03 May 2012 19:38:00 GMT

CRIMINAL LAW: SELF DEFENSE

Kidd v. State of Alabama

April 27, 2012

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS DEFINES LAW GOVERNING SELF-DEFENSE.

In this case, the party of Kidd was tried and convicted of murder. However, there were unclear testimonies regarding the events dealing with the actual shooting of the victim, William Hampton. It was found that both parties had pistols on his person. Kidd stated that he felt as if his life was endangered, because of Hampton’s violent past. He also stated, Hampton had suddenly pointed his gun at him, and Kidd felt he had no other choice, but to shoot. However, Kidd admitted he was a felon and was therefore violating the law by having a pistol on his person. Kidd appealed the courts decision claiming, the ruling was contradictory of Alabama’s self defense statute.

Decision: Affirmed. Alabama law states that a person is justified in applying deadly physical force upon another individual if he or she feels threatened by an impending deadly physical act against them. Also, this individual has this right as long as they are not “engaged in an unlawful activity.” Kidd, was in violation of Alabama law by carrying a gun on his person after being convicted as a felon. Kidd then claimed that the “unlawful activity” the statute mentioned, only applied to those acts listed. The court ruled that since this issue was not mentioned at trial, it was not eligible for appeal. The court found that Kidd was not free from fault because of his decision to have a weapon on his person. Therefore, according to the court, the Alabama statute regarding self defense was applied properly.

Mobile Airport Authority v. Etheredge

Fri, 27 Apr 2012 14:31:00 GMT

Mobile Airport Authority v. Etheredge

April 20, 2012

In this case, 57 year old Robert Etheredge filed a workers’ compensation charge against his employer, Mobile Airport Authority. In 2006 he injured his foot while on the job. Mobile Airport paid him temporary benefits for total disability from 2006 until 2009. Throughout this time period, Mr. Etheredge continued to have problems with his foot and was diagnosed with reflex sympathetic dystrophy. After the symptoms of his diagnosis were treated in 2007, he was allowed to go back to work. However, the pain in his foot persisted and a previous diagnosis of degenerative disk disease also intensified. Finally, in December of 2007, the employee suffered from certain working conditions that caused his degenerative disease to become aggressive and force him to undergo surgery to improve his state. After this surgery, he did not return to work. Even though the company provided evidence supporting that Mr. Etheredge’s job was considered to be less physically demanding, his physician testified that by being subjected to such conditions his patients’ condition was worsened. The court ruled that the employee was disabled completely and ruled in his favor. The employer appealed.

Decision: Affirmed. The company claimed that the issue resulting from Etheredge’s back condition was protected under the statute of limitations, but the court found that the employee’s worsened condition was caused by the actions he would partake in while working. Secondly, the court found that even though the back injury had occurred previously in 2007 without being reported, the company was still responsible for his medical expenses, because it had happened on the job and, because the company was already aware of his foot injury. Finally, the employer claimed that the injuries suffered by the employee were cumulative and therefore he was required to produce enough convincing evidence to prove his side of the argument. The company claimed he did not meet this necessity. The court found ruled otherwise.

Ex parte Advantage Resourcing, Inc. (Hollingshead V.Willstaff. Inc. et al.)

Fri, 27 Apr 2012 14:29:00 GMT

Ex parte Advantage Resourcing, Inc. (Hollingshead V.Willstaff. Inc. et al.)

April 20, 2012

In this case Hennon Hollingshead, an employee of Advantage Resourcing, Inc., filed a workers’ compensation complaint against Advantage. He claimed he had been injured on the job site and was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. He sought for medical and temporary disability benefits to be paid. The court awarded Mr. Hollingshead his claim. Advantage Resourcing appealed.

Decision: Writ of mandamus denied. By filing for a writ of mandamus without a final order being issued, the improper vehicle was used. Next, the court decided that the party of Hollingshead met provided enough evidence to support his claim to provide legal causation. Finally, with the expertise of two doctors, the court found that the employee was entitled to such benefits, regardless of his medical condition. The court stated that the condition of the employee was provoked by the accident the party of Hollingshead experienced.

Kilgore v. Kilgore

Fri, 27 Apr 2012 14:28:00 GMT

Kilgore v. Kilgore

April 24, 2012

The parties of Kilgore and Kilgore were divorced in 2009. They were given joint legal and physical custody of their only minor child. In 2010, the father filed a contempt and modification petition, claiming that the mother had been having overnight visitors of the opposite sex that she met online. The mother filed a counter claim suggesting that the father had not been acknowledging his part of the custodial agreement, because of his work schedule. In this instance, there was no evidence to support the claim against the mother, so the court awarded sole custody of the minor child to the mother. The father filed for appeal.

Decision: Reversed. The mother claimed, because of the fathers change in work schedule, his portion of the custodial responsibility had been lacking. Because of this clai, the courts granted the mother sole custody of the child. However, upon reexamination of the matter, the court ruled that no evidence supporting either parties claims could be presented. The previous decision of the court is to be reversed.

Maloney v. Papie

Fri, 27 Apr 2012 14:27:00 GMT

Maloney v. Papie

April 20, 2012

In 2002, the parties of Maloney and Papie were divorced. The mother gained custody of their three children, while the father was ordered to pay $1,179 per month. This amount included the children’s private school tuition. In 2009, the mother filed for postminority support and a contempt charge against the father for not paying child support. She also requested the father to pay for extreme medical bills incurred from the children. The father argued that the mother had told him they did not have to follow the ruling from the divorce, and so he admitted he did not pay child support in return for the mother being allowed to obtain property which he was awarded. It was fact that the children had not been enrolled in a private school for a period of time and the father requested a $500 credit. The court ruled in favor of the mother, granting her $9,661.21 for the childrens medical expenses. Also, the court ruled in favor of the mother on the issue of unpaid child support, and awarded her $50,132. The court also granted the father credit for the time during which the children were not enrolled in a private school. The mother appealed.

Decision: Reversed. The court did not state that a decrease in child support was to be made by the parent if the children were not enrolled within a private school, so the request for the father to receive a credit for the time the children were not incurring tuition costs, was denied.

Adams v. Adams

Fri, 27 Apr 2012 14:26:00 GMT

Adams v. Adams

April 20, 2012

COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS RULES THAT CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGER IS ALLOWED A DOLLAR-FOR-DOLLAR CREDIT AWARDED AGAINST HIS OR HER CHILD SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS.

The parties of this case were divorced in 2007. The father stated he would pay the amount of $2,000 per month in child support, as well as tuition for private schooling, fees, books, and other school-related costs beginning when the child entered kindergarten. Also, the father agreed to establish a trust fund intended for the child with a college savings plan. In 2009, the father entered a petition to modify the divorce decree. The mother responded by filing a counterclaim wishing to increase child support. At this time, the father reached age 66 and began collecting Social Security. Simultaneously, their child began receiving related benefits. In 2010, the father claimed he was eligible to receive a dollar for dollar credit toward his child support requirements. At trial, the father produced evidence to support an increase of annual income, while the mother showed evidence of a decrease in annual income. However, the trial court denied both requests.

Decision: Reversed. The court ruled that the child support provider is entitled to a credit when the child is receiving Social Security benefits. Also, no evidence had been presented to the court that the child’s needs had become greater and the court decided that the mothers income was not relevant to the issue at hand.

Maples v. Thomas

Fri, 27 Apr 2012 14:24:00 GMT

Maples v. Thomas

April 27, 2012

POSTCONVICTION RELIEF DEADLINE EXPANDED

Cory R. Maples, convicted of murder and sentenced to death, filed for postconviction relief under Ala. R. Crim. P. Rule 32 in 2001. He claimed that his sixth amendment right had been violated, in that he did not have proper representation. The issue regarding Mr. Maples’ representation focuses on the two out-of-state attorneys representing him. They were accompanied by an in-state lawyer by the name of Butler, who told Maples’ representation he was solely present for pro hac vice to take effect. He expressed his involvement would be minimal at most.

In 2002, while his petition was still pending, both of Maples’ attorneys left the firm they had been with, rendering them unable to represent their client. They also did not file for a leave to withdraw through the trial court. However, they were still listed as his attorneys. Maples petition was rejected in 2003, documents stating such were sent to the previous, and only, address on record for his representation and were sent back, unopened. No other attempts to reach them were made. Maples’ time to file for appeal had run out. Not long after, Mr. Maples was informed through direct communication with the assistant attorney general he had four weeks left to file a federal habeas petition. Through legal counsel, a renewed 42-day appeal period was requested and denied by the court. The order to renew the filing period was denied as well as a writ of mandamus, which would have allowed Maples time to file an out-of-time appeal. Maples filed for certiorari review with the United States Supreme Court

Decision: Affirmed. The court found the petitioner not to be in fault if evidence can be provided which supports his claim of procedural default and a violation of federal law can be discovered. Typically, negligence on behalf of representation of a prisoner cannot be viewed as cause, because the attorney is working for the prisoner under specific guidelines. However, in this case, the legal counsels for Maples abandoned their client without informing him or the courts of doing so. The court also discovered that the only other attorney involved in the case, did not even attempt to represent, or guide the out-of-state representation in this case. The court found that by having no notice of a withdrawal of legal counsel, and continuing to believe he was represented by his attorneys, Maples was kept from proceeding with his petition to the state.

Fuller v. Fuller

Fri, 27 Apr 2012 14:32:00 GMT

Fuller v. Fuller

April 21, 2012

COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS EXPLAINS UCCJEA OPERATION WITHIN CASE INCLUDING CANADIAN JUDGMENT.

The parties were married in 1999. They separated in 2004 as the wife, now expecting twins, moved to Canada. The husband filed for divorce in 2005 in Alabama. Court filed a judgment for divorce without any regard to custody, paternity, or child support, because of the mother’s objection to the Alabama courts jurisdiction over such issues. Later, the mother ordered the father to pay child support after receiving an order in Canada. Twice she attempted to register this judgment and was unsuccessful. The Alabama court ruled the Canadian judgment to be void, because the father was not served with the complaint initiating legal action.

In July 2009, a pleading entered as a modification, was filed by the mother. In this pleading she asked the courts to address matters concerning child support and custody. The father filed an answer to this pleading and a counterclaim requesting visitation. The court filed for judgment dealing with the issues expressed by the parties. It ruled that the parties receive joint custody of children, with the mother having sole custody. The father was required to pay $1, 254.47 per month, while the mother was required to pay for the children’s health insurance. The father filed a postjudgment motion asking that he pay for the children’s health insurance, so that he would not be paying 79.27% of the insurance being paid by the wife’s current husband. The court ruled in favor of the father, which amended their previous judgment and entered the new amount of $929.84 per month. However, the court excluded issues regarding the obligations of the health insurance premiums. The mother appealed.

Decision: Appeal dismissed in part; reversed. First, the court decided, under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), that the court did not have the jurisdiction to rule upon custody issues. This is, because the children were not born in the state of Alabama, rather in the “state” of Canada, entitling another location with the jurisdiction to determine custody issues as expressed in UCCJEA. Next, UIFSA or Uniform Interstate Family Support Act states that an Alabama court has the ability to issue an order for child support if another child support order has not been introduced, and if said individual lives in another state, or in this case a foreign country. Therefore, Alabama courts were entitled to jurisdiction to enter a child support order. The mother claimed that the courts did not address health insurance premiums paid by her current husband of $409.50 each month. This portion of the courts ruling did not follow Rule 32, which states that the total of health premium costs for the entire family must be used when calculating insurance support. The court strayed from Rule 32, claiming that it was “unjust” to include the entire amount of the premium be paid by the father. The court did not have adequate basis to deviate from Rule 32.

Next, the mother claimed she was unable to work, because of scoliosis. She disputed the awarded amount of child support. However, the trial court alone was allowed to judge her ability to work. Then, the mother argued that the court should have given her retroactive support from the twins birth, until the date of the judgment. The court did not consider this point, stating no record of the father’s income before 2009 was introduced. Finally, the court reviewed whether correct figures had been considered in arrearage. In the previous hearing the father had claimed he made $69,000 in 2009, but $40,000 in 2010. The trial court used the current income of the father to calculate amount due from April to December 2009. This part of the judgment is to be reversed.

Stroeker, Brunson and Brunson v. Harold

Fri, 27 Apr 2012 14:34:00 GMT

Stroeker, Brunson and Brunson v. Harold

April 13, 2012

COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS AFFIRMS JUDGMENT OF TRIAL COURT STATING THAT FATHER’S OBLIGATION TO HAVE LIFE INSURANCE POLICY NAMING CHILDREN AS BENEFICIARIES ENDED WHEN THE CHILDREN REACHED THE AGE OF MAJORITY.

In this case, the parties were divorced in 1993. The father was required to appoint his children with former wife, ages 6 and 3, as sole beneficiaries of his $100,000 life insurance policy. In 1995, the former husband went to prison. From that point until the former husband was released, the wife’s father paid many of the premiums of the policy. In 2009, the former husband changed the beneficiaries of his life insurance from his children to Judith Harold, whom he had been in a long term relationship with. In 2010, the former wife filed for contempt of the former husband, claiming violations of the portion of the divorce decree dealing with his life insurance policy. March 10, 2010 the former husband died. The party of Harold replaces the deceased as defendant in this case. Both the plaintiffs and defendant filed for summary judgments. The party of Harold’s motion was granted by the court. The plaintiffs appealed.

Decision: Affirmed. Contempt charges have two possible purposes: one, punishment for disobedience of orders given by the court, and two, forced obedience. The contempt charge was filed by the plaintiffs 4 hours before the defendant passed. But, the charge was not dismissed, because the plaintiffs sought for an adjustment of property rights of his life insurance policy. The court did not hold the deceased defendant in contempt, because no caselaw was discovered, which indicated that the estate of the deceased able to be found and punished under the rules regarding contempt. Also, the sole purpose of the designation of a life insurance policy to the children of a marriage is to insure payment of child support. Thus, the children’s possible monetary gain ended when they reached the age of majority.

Dyess v. Dyess

Fri, 27 Apr 2012 14:35:00 GMT

Dyess v. Dyess

April 21, 2012

A “complaint to sale and divide” property was made against Lajune Dyess by Edward Dyess. Lajune filed a counterclaim for a divorce stating that she and Edward Dyess entered into a common law marriage. The court found that a common law marriage had existed and granted a divorce between the parties. The court also awarded the former wife rights to the property under dispute and ordered the former husband to make mortgage payments on said property. Postjudgment motions were filed and the court ordered an amendment to the previous judgment requiring the parties to sell and divide their time share property in Mexico, equally, and ordered the former husband to pay $5,369.70 to his former wife to pay for attorney fees. The former husband appealed.

Decision: Reversed. The court found that there was insufficient evidence presented by the party of Lajune Dyess to properly support a common law marriage. The couple had no joint bank accounts, all deeds list both parties as single, and Edward never addressed Lajune as his wife while in public.

Office Max Inc. v. Academy Ltd.

Fri, 27 Apr 2012 14:36:00 GMT

Office Max Inc. v. Academy Ltd.

April 21, 2012

In July 2007, Sandra Richey filed an action claiming that she had acquired injuries to her knees and shoulders in 2002 and 2005. During which he was employed by Office Max, Inc. Three times she asked and was given orders requiring Office Max to award her medical care. Office Max refused, claiming that she had terminated her employment and had begun working for Academy Ltd. The party of Office Max suggested that her injuries had resulted while working for Academy Ltd. Academy filed for a summary judgment suggesting that any injuries Richey suffered, were results from injuries originally caused by her employment with Office Max. The court granted the summary judgment and a fourth motion which sought to require Office Max to pay for any and all surgeries associated with the employee’s injuries. Office Max appealed.

Decision: Appeal dismissed. In dealing with worker’s compensation actions, the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure apply. They state that when more than one claim is presented for relief, a final judgment must not be delayed. This case there was a pending claim for workers’ compensation, and no reference made to Rule 45. The appeals are set to be dismissed.

Yearby v. State of Alabama

Wed, 18 Apr 2012 23:39:00 GMT

Yearby v. State of Alabama

March 23, 2012

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS DECIDES, BASED ON CONSIDERATION OF FIRST IMPRESSION, THAT ALABAMA’S HINDERING PROSECUTION STATUTE DIRECTLY APPLIES TO THE ACT OF PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO A PROBATIONER OF A CLASS A FELONY SOUGHT FOR VIOLATION OF PROBATION.

In 2009, an attempt to apprehend Jonathan Yearby from his brother Daniel’s house was made. Jonathan was being charged with violation of the terms and conditions of his probation. Prior to his violations he had been charged with rape and sodomy in the first-degree.

Jonathan Yearby was found in the return air vent of his brother’s house after Daniel had consented for officers to search his property. He stated that he had not been in contact with Jonathan for two weeks. Daniel was indicted with first degree hindering prosecution and second degree unlawful possession of marijuana. Yearby filed two motions; the first motion to suppress the unlawful possession charge and the second to dismiss the hindering prosecution charge. Both were denied.

Decision: Affirmed. An issue of first impression is presented. According to the statute of hindering prosecution in the first degree, a person is guilty of such if he or she provides assistance to a convicted felon. This is defined by subject statute as, “the intention to hinder the apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of…a Class A or B felony.”

Buchannon v. State of Alabama

Wed, 18 Apr 2012 23:38:00 GMT

Buchannon v. State of Alabama

March 23, 2012

Thomas Buchannon pleaded guilty to theft of property in the first degree in 1997. His sentencing declared him as a habitual felony offender life imprisonment. Buchannon filed a motion for reconsideration of his sentence. The court denied his motion. Buchannon appealed.

Decision: Remanded. As stated by the Habitual Felony Offender Act, a Class A felony with no other Class A convictions, and who has been sentenced to life imprisonment under stated act, convictions of a Class B felony were allowed to seek for resentencing. Three requirements must be met in order to qualify for resentencing: One, the individual was sentenced before May 25, 2000. Two, individual was sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole. Three, the individual had no previous Class A felony convictions or was sentenced to life imprisonment. Buchannon is filing for a reconsideration of a Class B felony for theft of property in the first degree. In this case, the court mistakenly concluded Buchannon was unable to file a motion for reconsideration.