Legacy Key is a condominium complex in Orange Beach. The complex contains 36 residential units and some “limited common elements” including boat slips, storage houses, and carriage houses. The limited common elements were included in an amendment (“the first amendment”) to the declaration of condominium as required by Ala. Code 1975, § 35-8A-208(c), which is part of the Alabama Uniform Condominium Act (“the Act”). The amendment provided that the limited common elements would be appurtenant to the units. The owners were permitted to reallocate the limited common elements by an amendment to the declaration.

In December 2003, Ellen McKinney purchased Unit 903 in Legacy Key. The deed conveying the unit included Unit 903 “together with Storage Closet Number 1” and “Boat Slip Number 6.” The deed stated that the storage closet and the boat slip were appurtenances to Unit 903. In July 2007, McKinney and her husband refinanced the original $322,700 loan that was used to purchase Unit 903 and obtained a new loan in the amount of $700,000. Bank of America, N.A., was the lender and it held a mortgage on Unit 903 to secure the loan.

In 2009, McKinney executed an amendment to the declaration, transferring the storage closet and the boat slip from Unit 903 to Unit 101. Evelyn Kinslow is the owner of Unit 101. In 2010, Kinslow filed an action to quiet title to the storage closet and the boat slip. The trial court granted a motion for summary judgment filed by Kinslow and determined that the boat slip and the storage closet were for the exclusive use of Unit 101. Bank of America appealed. Reversed.

Bank of America argued that a limited common element is appurtenant to a unit and not to a unit owner. Section 35-8A-208 makes clear that the limited common elements are appurtenant to a unit in a condominium. Furthermore, the first amendment contemplates that the limited common elements would be appurtenant to a specific unit. The trial court erred as a matter of law. The Court then considered whether the limited common elements are subject to the terms of the mortgage. In this case, the limited common elements were not specifically included in the property subject to the mortgage. The Commissioners’ Commentary to § 35-8A-204 states that it is not necessary to continue to describe the limited common element interests that are appurtenant to a unit in an instrument conveying title to that unit. The Court held that a description meeting the requirements of § 35-8A-204 is sufficient to encompass the limited common elements appurtenant to that unit. Therefore, the limited common elements in this case were subject to the mortgage. Bank of America, N.A. v. Kinslow

The parties were divorced in 2009 by a judgment of the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court. Pursuant to an agreement of the parties that was incorporated into the decree of divorce, the mother was given primary physical custody of the parties’ two then-minor daughters and the father was given primary physical custody of the parties’ son. Since the divorce, the mother and the daughters have resided in Tuscaloosa County and the father and the son have resided in Pickens County.

On June 7, 2012, the mother petitioned the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court for emergency relief to enforce her right to summer visitation with the son. She also sought to hold the father in contempt and to modify post-minority support provisions in the decree.

The father filed an answer and counterclaim in which he sought to hold the mother in contempt. The father petitioned the Court of Civil Appeals for mandamus relief. The Court of Civil Appeals denied the petition without an opinion. The father petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for certiorari review.

Writ of mandamus issued. Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3-5, provides that venue for an action seeking modification or the enforcement of an order involving a child is proper in the county where the order was issued or in the county where the custodial parent and child have resided for at least three years. It further provides that if the residency requirement is satisfied, the custodial parent can select the venue. See also Ex parte Baker, 575 So.2d98 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990).

The mother did not dispute that the father satisfied the requirements of Section 30-3-5, but argued that the statute did not apply here because her action also involved claims relating to the daughters as to which venue was proper in Tuscaloosa County. The Court rejected this argument. The Court acknowledged the statute could result in inequities, but stated it was bound to say what the law is, not what it should be. Ex parte Brandon (In re: Brandon v. Brandon).

The parties were married in 1993. The father had at least three extra-marital affairs during the marriage. The parties had two children: a son born in 1999 and a daughter born in 2009.

The husband’s last affair began while the mother was pregnant with their daughter. Evidence was adduced that the affair had continued after the parties’ separation in August, 2009. After the separation, the father had custody of the son approximately 50 percent of the time. The father exercised visitation with the daughter but did not keep her overnight.

The father earned $5,868 per month. The mother earned $42,000 per year. Her net income was $2,750 per month and her expenses were $4,100 per month. The son attended private school. The court awarded the parties joint legal custody of the children with the mother having primary physical custody. The father was awarded visitation with the son on a 14-day rotating schedule wherein the father was awarded six days and six nights of visitation with the son. The mother exercised custody for the remaining eight days of each custodial period. In that same 14-day period, the father was awarded two days and two nights of visitation with the daughter as well as one four-hour midweek visit every other week.

The father was ordered to pay $1,049 per month for child support. He was ordered to equally split all expenses for extracurricular activities. He was also ordered to pay one-half of private school tuition. The father appealed.

Affirmed in part; reversed in part. (1) The father claimed that it was error for the court to order a different visitation schedule for him with the daughter than he was awarded with the son. “Although we agree with the father that there is no evidence indicating that he is incapable of caring for the daughter during the periods he has custody of the son, we note that the trial court’s decision was required to be based upon the best interest of the daughter.”He did not preserve the issue of the court’s failure to state its reason for deviating from Rule 32.

(2) Both parties agreed that they wanted the son to remain in private school and that he flourished in that environment. Moreover, it was undisputed that the son was an excellent athlete and that both parties encouraged him to participate in numerous extracurricular activities.  The father argued that he could not afford to pay these expenses. The Court estimated that the father would be required to pay another $270 per month. The trial court could have concluded that the father had the financial capacity to do so even in spite of his testimony to the contrary. The father claimed that his net income only exceeded his expenses by $110 per month. He allotted $900 for food and $75 for snacks for the son during his visitation period. He also had expenses for clothing, gifts for the children, household supplies, and insurance for two vehicles and a boat even though one vehicle and the boat were inoperable. “Thus, the trial court could have concluded that the father had the ability to pay the additional child support.”

(3) The Court rejected the father’s argument that he should not be required to repay the mother for the son’s trombone and his tuition expense accrued during the pendency of the action. The pendente lite order required the father to pay child sup- port and to contribute to the payment of monthly expenses. Taylor v Taylor

In April 2010, Ann LaRose (“the paternal grandmother”) and Kelly Hill (“the paternal aunt”) came to Alabama to exercise visitation with the child pursuant to a South Carolina consent judgment awarding the paternal grandparents visitation every third weekend and for two nonconsecutive two-week periods each summer.

The mother refused to permit the visitation. The next day, the mother filed a petition for protection from abuse action against both the paternal grandmother and the paternal aunt. This case was assigned case number DR-10-243. The court entered two ex parte protection orders.

On May 25, 2010, the paternal grandmother and the paternal grandfather filed a “Notice of Registration of Child Custody Determination.” That case was assigned case number DR-10-243.01. While the cases were pending, the paternal grandfather attempted to exercise visitation with the minor child. The mother filed a petition for protection from abuse against him and that case was assigned case number DR-10-481. All of the cases were consolidated for hearing.

The paternal grandparents and the paternal aunt appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals dismissed the appeal taken by the paternal grandmother and the paternal aunt in case number DR-10-243 and the appeal taken by the paternal grandfather in case number DR-10-481 because the appeal was filed more than 42 days after the entry of the August 10, 2012, judgment. The paternal grandparents’ appeal in DR-10-243.01 was timely.

The Court of Civil Appeals reversed that judgment and directed the trial court to communicate with the South Carolina court and correct the wording that suspended the paternal grandparents’ visitation rights. On remand, the trial court entered an order in cases DR-10-243, DR-10-243.01, and DR-10-481. It directed the mother to file a modification action with the South Carolina court by August 10, 2011, and it suspended the paternal grandparents’ right to visit with the child until that same date, or until the South Carolina court could review the case.

The mother filed for an extension of the PFA orders in case no. DR-10-243 and case no. DR-10-481. The trial court granted that motion and extended the protection order until August 15, 2012. The paternal grandparents filed a motion to reconsider on August 18, 2011. On December 19, 2011, the South Carolina court entered a judgment denying the mother’s request to transfer jurisdiction and venue to Alabama. The Alabama court conducted a hearing on January 5, 2012, and then entered an order in cases number DR-10-243 and DR-10-481 that entered a permanent PFA order. The paternal grandparents appealed. Appeal dismissed.  Larose v. Larose

The parties’ daughter was born in 1991. They were divorced in 1994. The mother was awarded physical custody of the parties’ daughter and the father was required to pay child support.

In 1995, the father filed a second complaint for divorce alleging that the parties had reconciled and had lived together as husband and wife. In 1996, the parties were divorced for a second time and the mother was awarded physical custody of the daughter.

In 2009, the mother filed a petition for post-minority college support. At the time of the hearing on that petition, the daughter had completed her freshman year at Troy University and had maintained a 4.0 grade-point average. The expenses of the daughter’s freshman year had been paid by a Pell grant, a student loan, a scholarship, the daughter’s part-time job, and contributions from the mother and a maternal aunt.

The father and the daughter had not seen one another for 15 years. The mother denied that she had tried to alienate the daughter from the father. The father was 54 years old and had recently been laid off from a construction company. He earned $36,000 in 2010. He owns no real estate and lives with his 75-year-old mother. The trial court ordered the parties to each be equally responsible for one-half of tuition, books, board, food, transportation, and medical insurance, after applying any scholarships. The child was required to maintain a “B” average. The father appealed. Reversed.

The father argued that the trial court erred in ordering post-minority support because he had not spoken to the child in many years. The evidence supported a conclusion that the mother, the father, and the daughter shared responsibility for the estrangement between the father and the daughter.

The father also argued that he did not have the ability to pay post-minority educational support without undue hardship. The daughter testified that she had applied for scholarships but not that she had received any. Moreover, the judgment does not make the father’s financial obligation subject to application of the Pell grant that the daughter had been awarded. Nor did it make the father’s obligation subject to the student loan or income from the daughter’s part-time job. The judgment of the trial court is due to be reversed. Howell v. Dantone

Sentence.

Nathan Shelly was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment on a manslaughter conviction in 2009. He was placed in the custody of the Alabama Department of Corrections (“the Department”). Prior to March 9, 2012, Shelly was classified as a “Class I Prisoner” and earned a deduction of 75 days for every 30 days he served. In March 2012, the Department determined based on an opinion of the Alabama Attorney General, that inmates convicted of manslaughter could be considered only “Class II Prisoners” and thus could earn good time at a rate of no more than 40 days for every 30 days served. Shelly’s rate of earning good time was changed and his good-time balance dropped. Shelly filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Shelly appealed. Reversed. Ala. Code 1975, § 14-9-41 (“the Act”), sets forth the standards for good time credit. It states that “No person may be placed in Class I if he or she has been convicted of an assault where the victims of the assault suffered the permanent loss or use or permanent partial loss or use of any bodily organ or appendage.” In a 1997 opinion, the Office of the Attorney General opined that any person convicted of manslaughter has committed an assault resulting in the permanent loss or use of the victim’s bodily organs or appendages.

The parties’ daughter was born in 1991. They were divorced in 1994. The mother was awarded physical custody of the parties’ daughter and the father was required to pay child support.

In 1995, the father filed a second complaint for divorce alleging that the parties had reconciled and had lived together as husband and wife. In 1996, the parties were divorced for a second time and the mother was awarded physical custody of the daughter.

In 2009, the mother filed a petition for post-minority college support. At the time of the hearing on that petition, the daughter had completed her freshman year at Troy University and had maintained a 4.0 grade-point average. The expenses of the daughter’s freshman year had been paid by a Pell grant, a student loan, a scholarship, the daughter’s part-time job, and contributions from the mother and a maternal aunt.

The father and the daughter had not seen one another for 15 years. The mother denied that she had tried to alienate the daughter from the father. The father was 54 years old and had recently been laid off from a construction company. He earned $36,000 in 2010. He owns no real estate and lives with his 75-year-old mother. The trial court ordered the parties to each be equally responsible for one-half of tuition, books, board, food, transportation, and medical insurance, after applying any scholarships. The child was required to maintain a “B” average. The father appealed. Reversed.

The father argued that the trial court erred in ordering post-minority support because he had not spoken to the child in many years. The evidence supported a conclusion that the mother, the father, and the daughter shared responsibility for the estrangement between the father and the daughter.

The father also argued that he did not have the ability to pay post-minority educational support without undue hardship. The daughter testified that she had applied for scholarships but not that she had received any. Moreover, the judgment does not make the father’s financial obligation subject to application of the Pell grant that the daughter had been awarded. Nor did it make the father’s obligation subject to the student loan or income from the daughter’s part-time job. The judgment of the trial court is due to be reversed. Howell v. Dantone

The parties’ daughter was born in 1991. They were divorced in 1994. The mother was awarded physical custody of the parties’ daughter and the father was required to pay child support.

In 1995, the father filed a second complaint for divorce alleging that the parties had reconciled and had lived together as husband and wife. In 1996, the parties were divorced for a second time and the mother was awarded physical custody of the daughter.

In 2009, the mother filed a petition for post-minority college support. At the time of the hearing on that petition, the daughter had completed her freshman year at Troy University and had maintained a 4.0 grade-point average. The expenses of the daughter’s freshman year had been paid by a Pell grant, a student loan, a scholarship, the daughter’s part-time job, and contributions from the mother and a maternal aunt.

The father and the daughter had not seen one another for 15 years. The mother denied that she had tried to alienate the daughter from the father. The father was 54 years old and had recently been laid off from a construction company. He earned $36,000 in 2010. He owns no real estate and lives with his 75-year-old mother. The trial court ordered the parties to each be equally responsible for one-half of tuition, books, board, food, transportation, and medical insurance, after applying any scholarships. The child was required to maintain a “B” average. The father appealed. Reversed.

The father argued that the trial court erred in ordering post-minority support because he had not spoken to the child in many years. The evidence supported a conclusion that the mother, the father, and the daughter shared responsibility for the estrangement between the father and the daughter.

The father also argued that he did not have the ability to pay post-minority educational support without undue hardship. The daughter testified that she had applied for scholarships but not that she had received any. Moreover, the judgment does not make the father’s financial obligation subject to application of the Pell grant that the daughter had been awarded. Nor did it make the father’s obligation subject to the student loan or income from the daughter’s part-time job. The judgment of the trial court is due to be reversed. Howell v. Dantone

The parties’ daughter was born in 1991. They were divorced in 1994. The mother was awarded physical custody of the parties’ daughter and the father was required to pay child support.

In 1995, the father filed a second complaint for divorce alleging that the parties had reconciled and had lived together as husband and wife. In 1996, the parties were divorced for a second time and the mother was awarded physical custody of the daughter.

In 2009, the mother filed a petition for post-minority college support. At the time of the hearing on that petition, the daughter had completed her freshman year at Troy University and had maintained a 4.0 grade-point average. The expenses of the daughter’s freshman year had been paid by a Pell grant, a student loan, a scholarship, the daughter’s part-time job, and contributions from the mother and a maternal aunt.

The father and the daughter had not seen one another for 15 years. The mother denied that she had tried to alienate the daughter from the father. The father was 54 years old and had recently been laid off from a construction company. He earned $36,000 in 2010. He owns no real estate and lives with his 75-year-old mother. The trial court ordered the parties to each be equally responsible for one-half of tuition, books, board, food, transportation, and medical insurance, after applying any scholarships. The child was required to maintain a “B” average. The father appealed. Reversed.

The father argued that the trial court erred in ordering post-minority support because he had not spoken to the child in many years. The evidence supported a conclusion that the mother, the father, and the daughter shared responsibility for the estrangement between the father and the daughter.

The father also argued that he did not have the ability to pay post-minority educational support without undue hardship. The daughter testified that she had applied for scholarships but not that she had received any. Moreover, the judgment does not make the father’s financial obligation subject to application of the Pell grant that the daughter had been awarded. Nor did it make the father’s obligation subject to the student loan or income from the daughter’s part-time job. The judgment of the trial court is due to be reversed. Howell v. Dantone

The parties were divorced in 2003. The divorce judgment provided that the former husband would pay $30,000 to the former wife within 90 days from the date of the judgment and that the former wife would convey her interest in the property to the former husband via a quitclaim deed.

In June 2010, the former wife filed a petition for contempt alleging that the former husband had not paid $24,365.76 of the amount he had been required to pay under the divorce judgment. The former husband filed a counterclaim asserting that the former wife had failed to comply with the quitclaim-deed requirement in the divorce judgment.

At the trial, the former wife submitted an exhibit which showed that the former husband owed $68,628.47 for the former wife’s interest in the marital residence. The exhibit included annually compounded interest on the unpaid portions of the $30,000 principal amount. The former husband appealed.

Reversed. The post-judgment interest statute that was in effect at the time of the divorce judgment provided simple interest at 12 percent. Ala. Code 1975, § 8-8-10. The former wife argued that the former husband failed to timely challenge the interest calculation. Because the trial court made an express finding that the former husband owed $68,628.47 “after interest is added in,” the former husband was not required to challenge that finding in a post-judgment motion in order to preserve that issue for appellate review.

The former wife also posited that any error made by the court was harmless because the court could have awarded attorney fees, costs, and other damages in addition to principal and interest. The Court rejected that argument because the trial court’s judgment did not indicate any intent to award such ancillary relief.

The judgment of the trial court is due to be reversed.