GOVERNMENT: Immunity
05/25/2012, Macon County, AL
Ex parte Walker (In re: Harris v. Walker)

Miguel Harris sued Macon County, the Macon County Commission, and Marcus Walker, an employee of the Macon County Sheriff’s Department, arising out of injuries he suffered in an automobile accident involving Walker. The complaint alleged that Walker was operating the vehicle within the line and scope of his employment as a deputy sheriff at the time of the accident the trial court dismissed the other defendants based on State immunity, but denied Walker’s motion to dismiss. Walker petitioned for a writ of mandamus. Writ of mandamus issued. Harris conceded that Walker was immune from suit in his official capacity as a deputy sheriff, but stated that the complaint made claims against him in his individual capacity. The Court noted that it had considered a similar situation in Ex parte Blankenship, 893 So.3d 303 (Ala. 2004).  There, the Court held where it is undisputed that a deputy sheriff was acting within the line and scope of his employment at the time he is involved in an automobile accident, Section 14, Ala. Const. 1901, bars an action against the deputy for damages arising out of the accident. In Blankenship, as here, it was alleged in the complaint and admitted by the defendant that the deputy was acting in the line and scope of his employment at the time of the accident. There was no allegation that Walker had deviated from the normal scope of his employment as a deputy at the time of the accident. Accordingly, Walker was immune from suit pursuant to Section 14.

State of Alabama v. J.B.

In the District Court of Shelby County, Alabama

Case No: DC-2011-2226

Summary:  Client was charged with two cases of 1^st degree kidnapping, 13A-6-43,  Class “A” Felony and Sexual Abuse, 13A-6-66, a Class “A” Felony along with two other defendants.  Through our efforts and after considerable work and investigation, the client was able to show that he was not present at the time of the crimes and that the allegations were based upon mistaken identification.  All charges dismissed.

Disposition: Cases Dismissed

GOVERNMENT: Immunity
05/25/2012, Jefferson County, AL
Ex parte Board of Dental Examiners of Alabama
(In re: Wilkinson v. Board of Dental Examiners of Alabama)

Mary Ann Wilkinson was employed by the Board of Dental Examiners of Alabama (“the Board”) for several years until her employment was terminated in 2009. She sued the Board seeking compensation she alleged was due pursuant to her employment contracts with the Board. The Board filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that as a State agency, it was immune from suit under Ala. Const. 1901, Art. I, Section 14. The trial court agreed and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed, concluding that the Board did not qualify as an “immediate and strictly governmental agency of the State,” and therefore was not entitled to Section 14 immunity. The Board petitioned for a writ of certiorari. Reversed. In determining whether the Board was a State agency entitled to immunity, the Court first looked at the character of power delegated to the Board. Chapter 9 of Title 34, Ala. Code 1975, provides detailed requirements and regulations regarding the practice of dentistry and dental hygiene in the State. The Board is thereby vested with the authority to carry out the purposes and enforce the pro- visions of that chapter.  Further, Ala. Code 1975, Section 34-9-46, gives the Board the power to issue subpoenas, and to compel the attendance of witnesses and production of documents relating to disciplinary proceedings.  The Court found that the character of these powers and duties delegated to the Board supported a finding that it was a State agency entitled to Section 14 immunity. The Court next looked to the relation of the Board to the State, noting that immunity, among other things, is designed to shield the State treasury and not to afford immunity to every entity created by statute. The legislature requires the Board to establish and collect fees, but provides the maximum fees that can be established and collected. The Court stated that once the Board collects the funds established by the legislature, they become State funds. “The mere fact that the legislature appropriates those funds before they reach the State treasury does not alter their status as State funds.” Ala. Code 1975, Section 41-20-12, provides that if the Board, among other agencies, is terminated, its funds will revert back to the state fund from which its appropriation was made. The Court found that these factors showed that the relationship between the Board and the State supported the conclusion that the Board is a State agency. Finally, the Court concluded that the nature of the function performed by the Board supported a finding that it was entitled to State immunity. The Board promulgates rules and regulations governing the practice of dentistry, investigates violations, and takes disciplinary action against those found to be guilty. The Court found that the facts of this case were akin to those in Mooneyham v. State Board of Chiropractic Examiners, 802 So.2d 200 (Ala. 2001).  There, the Court concluded that the Board of Chiropractic Examiners was entitled to immunity as a regulatory body that receives its funding from the State. “Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the Board is ‘an arm of the state’ rather than a mere ‘franchisee licensed for some beneficial purpose.’” Accordingly, the Board was entitled to Section 14 immunity.

CIVIL PROCEDURE: Injunction
05/25/2012, Madison County, AL
Monte Sano Research Corporation v. Kratos Defense and Security Solutions, Inc.,

Kratos Defense and Security Solutions, Inc. (“Kratos”), a defense contractor, filed a complaint against Monte Sano Research Corporation, Steven Thornton, and Steven Teague, alleging the defendants, among other things, wrongfully diverted business opportunities and misappropriated confidential and proprietary information. Kratos applied for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and preliminary injunction. The trial court enjoined the defendants from procuring any work from any prime contractor at Redstone Arsenal. The defendants appealed.  Reversed. The Court explained that a plaintiff that can recover damages has an adequate remedy at law and is not entitled to an injunction. The party seeking the injunction has the burden of demonstrating that it lacks an adequate remedy. Ormco Corp. v. Johns, 869 So.2d 1109 (Ala. 2003).  Here, the Court concluded that the injunction was overbroad and not supported by the evidence. The record indicated that Kratos was concerned with only a certain prime contract, but the injunction prevented the defendants from providing any subcontract work for any prime contractor at Redstone Arsenal. Further, the trial court’s order was held to violate Rule 65(d)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., by failing to provide the reasons for the issuance of the injunction and failing to be specific in its terms. The trial court also failed to address whether an adequate remedy at law existed for Kratos. The trial court thus erred in issuing the injunction. The Court remanded the case with instructions for the trial court to dissolve the injunction. The Court noted that Kratos was not precluded from requesting the trial court to again issue an injunction, provided it was narrower in scope and complied with Rule 65.

CIVIL PROCEDURE:  Jurisdiction
05/18/2012, Wilcox County, AL
Attenta, Inc. v. Calhoun

Robert Calhoun, Jr., the husband of Lulu Calhoun, was fatally injured while employed by Linden Lumber Company, Inc. (“Linden”). Calhoun filed a complaint against Linden in the Marengo Circuit Court seeking workers’ compensation benefits (“the Marengo County action”). The litigation continued and after an apparent settlement was reached, Linden’s insurer, Attenta, Inc., discontinued monthly payments to Calhoun on the theory that settlements had been reached extinguishing Linden’s liability to Calhoun. Calhoun then filed suit against Linden and Attenta in Wilcox County (“the Wilcox County action”), alleging the tort of outrage, fraud, and conspiracy.  The defendants unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the Wilcox Co. action based on, among other things, lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The case was tried to a jury solely on the tort of outrage claim against Attenta, and the jury awarded Calhoun $3,695,298. Attenta appealed. Judgment vacated; appeal dismissed. The Court explained that the Marengo Co. action was still pending when the Wilcox Co. action was commenced. The absence of a Rule 54(b) certification of the order on Calhoun’s claim rendered it interlocutory and subject to modification any time before the entry of a final judgment. ArvinMeritor, Inc. v. Handley, 12 So.3d 669 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007).  The Court pointed out that Calhoun’s right to continued workers’ compensation payments awarded in the Marengo County action was the threshold issue in the Wilcox Co. action and was inextricably intertwined with the subrogation aspect of the Marengo Co. order. Moreover, the Court noted the well settled rule that where two courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the first to take cognizance of a cause of action has exclusive jurisdiction. Grimes v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 726 So.2d 615 (Ala. 1998

TORTS: Wrongful Death
05/18/2012, DeKalb County, AL
Hamilton v. Scott