Alimony—Contempt.

The parties were married for 35 years. The husband testified that he had inherited 2,484 shares of ExxonMobil Corporation stock from his mother in 1997. Those stocks were transferred into his name only and the dividends were reinvested. The husband further claimed that he had inherited $99,712 in cash from his mother, which he deposited into a certificate of deposit (“CD”). He continuously reinvested the money in the CD until 2008 when he withdrew all of the money ($133,312.25) and purchased ExxonMobil stock with it.

The husband also contended that he had inherited $23,000 in United States savings bonds from the mother and that he redeemed them in 2005. He placed the money in a money-market account held jointly in his and his wife’s names. The money was used to pay the parties’ joint tax liability. The husband also inherited money from his aunt. He received one check for $60,000 that he deposited and then used to purchase ExxonMobil stock. He deposited another $27,000 into his personal bank account and purchased more stock.

The dividend income from the stock was listed on the parties’ joint tax return. The total amount of taxes paid on the husband’s inherited assets was $32,253. The parties owned a residence worth $247,000 that was not encumbered by a mortgage. They had a joint money market account containing $210,000. The husband receives $1,678 per month in Social Security benefits, a monthly pension check in the amount of $363, and another pension check in the amount of $580 per month.

The wife receives $598 per month in Social Security benefits. The husband claimed that the wife had committed two acts of domestic violence toward him, including hitting him in the head with a plate. The wife claimed that the husband had threatened to kill her on numerous occasions and that he threw objects at her. According to her, he had abused her approximately once per month from the year 2000 until present. She admitted throwing the plate at him but stated that it was done in response to the husband’s constant emotional abuse. The wife testified that the husband’s ExxonMobil stock was worth$758,000.

Her monthly expenses were $2,845.74. The wife had a history of heart problems and had undergone a hip replacement. She anticipated having surgery on her foot in the future. The trial court awarded the husband 100 percent of his ExxonMobil stock and the marital residence. He was ordered to pay the wife $160,550 as her share of the equity in the residence. The wife was awarded $2,500 per month in periodic alimony and the money-market account was divided equally.

The husband was ordered to pay the wife’s attorney fees in the amount of $14,625. The husband appealed and the wife filed a cross-appeal. On initial appeal, the Court of Civil Appeals determined that the award of alimony was excessive. On September 22, 2011, the husband filed a motion requesting a hearing regarding the issues to be addressed as a result of the Court of Civil Appeals’ opinion.

On March 1, 2012, the court entered a judgment dividing the parties’ marital property and recalculating the husband’s alimony obligation. His alimony obligation was reduced to $1,310.59 per month. The provisions of the original property division remained the same except that the wife was awarded an additional $84,000. The husband appealed. Affirmed. The judgment of the trial court is due to be affirmed. Kreitzberg v. Kreitzberg

APPEAL & ERROR: Mandamus.

Veolia Environment SVC is a defendant in a workers’ compensation action Christopher Herring injured his knee while working for Veolia. On the first-report-of-injury form, the incident was described as having taken place while Herring “was climbing . . . on his truck to get a cart. He alleges that he hit his right knee on the lip of the packing blade.”

The form lists Veolia’s address as being in Lincoln County. Odis Moore, Veolia’s area safety manager, submitted an affidavit stating that Veolia’s principal place of business was in Talladega County and that all witnesses who were involved in this accident were working in Veolia’s Talladega County location.

Herring filed the action in Etowah County. Veolia filed a motion to dismiss or in the alternative, a motion to change venue under the forum non conveniens statute, Ala. Code 1975, § 6-3-21.1. The trial court denied Veolia’s motion and it filed a petition for writ of mandamus. Writ of mandamus denied.

Veolia argued that it was entitled to a writ of mandamus directing the Etowah County Circuit Court to transfer the action because it established that Talladega County would be a more convenient forum and that the interests of justice compelled transfer of the action under § 6-3-21.1. With regard to the convenience-of-the-parties prong, the “meager showing made by Veolia is insufficient to support a conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Veolia’s motion.”

The convenience of nonparty witnesses that are employees of one of the parties to the case does not weigh heavily in favor of a transfer. Ex parte Nichols, 757 So.2d 374, 379 (Ala. 1999). “The fact that the witnesses employed by Veolia . . . might be located closer to Talladega County or might be inconvenienced by having to travel to Etowah County, then does not entitle Veolia to a transfer of the action under the forum non-conveniens statute.”

With regard to the interests of justice prong, Veolia presented evidence indicating that its principal place of business is in Talladega County and that the accident giving rise to the action occurred in Talladega County. However, it failed to establish a “nexus” or connection between Herring’s action and the original forum is not strong enough to warrant burdening Herring’s chosen forum with the action. Accordingly, the petition for writ of mandamus is due to be denied. Ex parte Veolia Environmental SVC (Herring v. Veolia Environ- mental SVC),